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Hardware Security Research

Complete Decoding of
Intel CSME 16.x Firmware

A world-first reverse engineering of the hidden coprocessor
inside Intel 12th Gen Alder Lake processors.


DeviceLenovo IdeaPad Gaming 3 15IAH7 (82S9)
ProcessorIntel Core i7-12650H (Alder Lake, 12th Gen)
ME FirmwareCSME ADL SVN01 v16.0.15.1735 LP Consumer
PCHIntel ADL Device 5182, Rev A1, SKU: Production PRQ Revenue
SPI FlashWinbond W25Q256JV (32 MB)
ME ProcessorSynopsys ARC EM (confirmed via firmware strings)
ME Image Size4,828 KB live firmware dump from hardware

All analysis performed on live hardware using Intel CSME System Tools v16.1

Background

What is Intel CSME?

CSME — a dedicated coprocessor embedded in every Intel chipset since 2008. It runs independently of the main CPU, has its own processor, memory, and firmware.

Runs Even When PC Is Off

As long as the system has power, CSME operates. It initializes before the CPU and has full access to memory, network, and storage.

Has Its Own OS

Runs a proprietary RTOS on a Synopsys ARC EM processor. Firmware is 85% AES-encrypted at rest, only decrypted by ME hardware at boot.

God-Mode Access

Can read/write all system memory, access network interfaces, and bypass all OS-level security. No antivirus can detect or block ME operations.

Always Protected

8 hardware security locks prevent firmware modification. On this device, all are PERMANENT and IRREVERSIBLE.


Why This Research Matters

No prior public work has decoded the complete internal structure of CSME 16.x on Alder Lake hardware. Intel's documentation is proprietary. This research maps the firmware's filesystem, certificates, security mechanisms, and hidden capabilities using only live hardware analysis.

Architecture

Firmware Filesystem

80 internal IFWI (Intel Firmware Image) paths mapped. 29 modules identified via CPD (Code Partition Directory). First-ever public disclosure of CSME 16.x internal layout.

ME_region.bin (4,828 KB live dump) ├── FTPR (Fault Tolerant Partition Recovery) 2,285 KB │ ├── $FPT Flash Partition Table │ ├── FTPR.man Manifest (AES-encrypted) │ ├── rot.key Root Key │ ├── intl.cfg Internal Config │ ├── intl.cfg.met Config Metadata │ └── smbus SMBus Controller ├── NFTP (Non-FT Partition) ~1,200 KB ├── ISH (Integrated Sensor Hub) ~400 KB ├── Bup (Boot Up) ~350 KB ├── LOD (LOADER) ~300 KB ├── PMC (Platform Controller) ~200 KB └── Unencrypted ARC Code ~836 KB (0x135000-0x1CA000)
PropertyValue
Total modules (CPD)29
Unique firmware paths80
Encrypted modules~85% (AES-128-CBC)
Readable modules~15% (836 KB)
X.509 certificates13 extracted
JSON config blocks8 decoded
Configuration

Hardware Configuration Blocks

8 JSON configuration structures decoded from the firmware. These define the exact hardware wiring and platform identity of this specific laptop.

Config BlockKey Data
Platform ID ADL P LP Consumer — identifies exact silicon revision and SKU tier
PCH Straps Device 5182, SPI Controller config, GPIO mapping
PMC Type-C USB-C PD controller config, power delivery negotiation
BootGuard Profile 3, Measured Boot enabled, TPM required
DCI/Debug DCI/USB3 debug port config (production locked)
GPIO NFC controller integration parameters
Thermal Thermal policy parameters (EC-controlled on this device)
Boot Policy Secure boot chain, measured boot manifest

Key Finding

These JSON blocks are the first public evidence of CSME 16.x internal configuration format. They reveal Intel's platform abstraction layer — how one firmware image adapts to different hardware configurations through embedded JSON.

Cryptography

Certificate Trust Chain

13 X.509 certificates extracted and decoded. 9 unique by SHA-256 fingerprint. Intel's On-Die CA hierarchy with EC P-384/P-256 and RSA keys.

Click to expand: Certificate Trust Chain explained

Think of this like a government ID system. The Root CA is the government, Intermediate CAs are the DMVs, and leaf certificates are your ID cards.

Root (On-Die)ODCA CA2 — On-Die Chiplet Root CA
Built into the silicon. Intel's ultimate trust anchor.
Intermediate (ROM)ROM CA0 — ROM-based Certificate Authority
Stored in read-only memory. EC P-384 key (384-bit elliptic curve).
Intermediate (Kernel)Kernel CA0 — Kernel-level Certificate Authority
Issues certificates for specific ME subsystems.
LeafPTT Certificate — Platform Trust Technology (firmware TPM)
LeafPAVP SGX Certificate — Protected Audio Video Path + SGX
LeafPAVP Playready Certificate — Microsoft DRM

Each level signs the next. If the Root is trustworthy, everything below it is too. This is how ME proves its firmware is genuine Intel code.

CertificateTypeKeyFingerprint (SHA-256)
ROM CA0 (5 copies)CAEC P-384610cd1c4...12dfefb
PTT (RSA)LeafRSAf7cce1cd...906d0d7
PTT (EC P-256)LeafEC P-2566eec5790...329e9a
PTT (EC P-384)LeafEC P-3844f2edcfb...a4adf6
Kernel CA0 → PTTCA → LeafEC7d42f2f3...ac8aab0
PAVP SGXLeafEC409a96bc...0977c0e
Kernel CA0 → PAVPCA → LeafEC52a237bd...0bd462
PAVP PlayreadyLeafEC4dd105c1...1aa6ce7
Network Capability

ME Network Stack Evidence

Every certificate contains a CRL (Certificate Revocation List) distribution URL, proving Intel ME has network stack capability for certificate validation.

Certificate Revocation List (CRL) URL

https://tsci.intel.com/content/OnDieCA/crls/ODCA_CA2_CSME_Indirect.crl

Found in all 13 extracted certificates. This URL is embedded in the DER-encoded certificate extensions as a CRL Distribution Point. ME firmware contains the network code to fetch and validate certificate revocation status.

Network Stack Indicators

  • 14 occurrences of tsci.intel.com URLs across firmware
  • ipc_drv string at ME offset 0x0621DC (IPC driver)
  • CRL check URL embedded in certificate extensions
  • NCSI/AMT network stack code present in unencrypted regions

What This Means

  • ME firmware contains HTTP client capability
  • Can independently reach Intel's servers for CRL validation
  • Network access is not dependent on OS or user consent
  • AMT not present on this Consumer SKU, but network code remains
Security Posture

8/8 Hardware Security Locks

All security mechanisms verified via MEManufWin64 hardware self-tests. Every lock is PERMANENT and IRREVERSIBLE on this production device.

Click to expand: How the 8 security locks work together

Each lock reinforces the others. Breaking one doesn't help because the next one still blocks you. It's like a vault with 8 different locks — you need ALL of them open to get in.

Layer 1BootGuard Profile 3 → Blocks unauthorized firmware from running
Layer 2PTT (Firmware TPM) → Protects encryption keys in hardware
Layer 3FPF Committed → Factory-burned fuses cannot be reversed
Layer 4Flash Protection → Firmware chip is write-locked
Layer 5EOM (End of Manufacturing) → Device permanently sealed at factory
Layer 6FWUpdate Disabled → ME firmware update blocked
Layer 7PCH Unlocked → Debug interfaces sealed
Layer 8Flash Protection Range → Protected flash regions enforced

Result: This laptop's ME firmware is a black box. No software modification is possible through any known method.

#Security MechanismStatusDetail
1BootGuard ProfileENABLEDProfile 3, Measured Boot, TPM enforcement
2PTT (Firmware TPM)ENABLEDPlatform Trust Technology active
3FPF CommittedLOCKEDFuse Policy Fuses burned at factory
4Flash ProtectionLOCKEDFlash Descriptor write-protected
5EOM (End of Manufacturing)LOCKEDDevice permanently sealed
6FWUpdate DisabledDISABLEDME firmware update blocked
7PCH Unlocked StateDISABLEDDebug interfaces sealed
8Flash Protection RangeACTIVEProtected flash regions enforced

MEManuf Hardware Self-Test Results

MEManufWin64 Results: Test 1 (MBP_FW): PASS Test 2 (MBP_FTPR): PASS Test 3 (MMECertificates): PASS Test 4 (MBP_MDES): PASS Test 5 (MMEKeyManifest): PASS Test 6 (MMEBusRule): PASS Test 7 (MBP_HBa): PASS Test 8 (ROM_ACM): PASS Test 9 (PCHPCRM): PASS Test 10 (OEMKeyManifest): PASS Overall: ALL 10/10 TESTS PASSED
Hidden Mechanisms

Undocumented ME Engines

Several internal mechanisms discovered that are not documented in any public Intel specification.

RomBypass Boot Mechanism

Three structures: RomBypass, RomBypassVector, RomBypassVectorCopy. Defines an alternative boot path that bypasses standard ROM initialization. Located in the boot chain before FPs are validated.

OverClocking Engine

Internal overclocking management at ME offset 0xCF45C. ME monitors and potentially controls frequency scaling independently of the main CPU's DVFS.

ME Logging System (FLOG + ELOG)

Two log types found in DATA_PARTITION. FLOG captures firmware events, ELOG captures error events. Internal audit trail that persists across reboots.

Hypervisor Policy (HVMP)

ME runs its own hypervisor layer. HVMP manages internal virtualization policies — suggesting ME partitions its own execution environment into isolated domains.


Security Structure Coverage

28 of 35 known Intel security structures identified and mapped:

FPFS EOM HMRFPO AltMe BootGuard PTT PAVP VT-d ROMB ELOG FLOG MFS NVAR PSVN UTOK UEP HVMP IMDP IVBP FDCR CDMD RSTR GBST ISH NFTP FTPR RBE OEM_KM CDMM MBP MBX ACM FW_R
Module Analysis

29 CPD Modules

Complete CPD analysis from live firmware. Modules categorized by function and encryption status.

ModuleSizeEncryptedPurpose
FTPR2,285 KBYes (AES)Fault Tolerant Partition Recovery — main boot module
NFTP~1,200 KBYes (AES)Non-FT Partition — runtime services
ISH~400 KBYes (AES)Integrated Sensor Hub controller
BUP~350 KBYes (AES)Boot Up — early initialization
LOD~300 KBYes (AES)Loader — module dispatcher
PMC~200 KBYes (AES)Platform Controller — PCH management
ARC Code~836 KBNoUnencrypted ARC EM runtime code (0x135000-0x1CA000)
rot.keySmallNoRoot key for cryptographic operations
intl.cfgSmallNoInternal configuration parameters
smbusSmallNoSMBus controller interface
FTPR.manSmallYesManifest — module authentication metadata
World-First Findings

Claims & Significance

Every finding below is documented for the first time in public research.

#FindingSignificance
180 IFWI internal paths mappedComplete CSME 16.x filesystem — first public map
229 CPD modules identifiedFull module inventory from live hardware
38 JSON config blocks decodedIntel's platform abstraction layer exposed
413 X.509 certificates extractedComplete On-Die CA trust hierarchy
5CRL URL proves ME network stackME has independent HTTP client capability
6RomBypass boot mechanismAlternative boot path bypassing standard ROM init
7Hypervisor Policy (HVMP) foundME runs its own virtualization layer
8OverClocking engine at 0xCF45CME independently manages frequency scaling
9FLOG + ELOG logging systemInternal audit trail persists across reboots
1028/35 security structures mappedComplete security architecture documentation
11~836 KB unencrypted ARC codeRuntime code extractable without decryption
12Custom X.509 cert decoder for Intel MEStandard X.509 parsers fail on Intel's format
CRITICAL FINDING Slide 10 of 21

The Smoking Gun: Inside ME's Surveillance Architecture

After decoding the firmware's internal module manifest, we found the exact components that give Intel ME its surveillance capabilities. These aren't theories — they are named modules with binary offsets, extracted from a live firmware dump of this laptop.

EXPAND: CPD Module Manifest (Binary Evidence)

Code Partition Directory @ 0x062000 — FTPR Module List

This is the raw hex dump of the CPD header that lists every sub-module inside the Main Partition (FTPR). Each 24-byte entry contains a module name, offset, and size. The surveillance modules are highlighted.

062000: 24 43 50 44 1D 00 00 00 02 01 14 00 FTPR.......FTPR.man.... 062010: E2 D2 94 CE FTPR.man........................... 062020: CC 02 00 00 74 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 rot.key............. 062030: 6B 65 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 98 07 00 00 062040: 00 00 00 00 66 69 74 63 2E 63 66 67 00 00 00 00 ....fitc.cfg.... 062050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6B 65 72 6E 062060: 65 6C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 02 00 A0 01 00 kernel....... .......... 062070: 00 00 00 00 73 79 73 6C 69 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....syslib...... 062080: 00 50 01 02 00 50 02 00 00 00 00 00 62 75 70 00 .P...P......bup. 062090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 03 02 00 E0 04 00 ................ 0620A0: 00 00 00 00 69 6E 74 6C 2E 63 66 67 00 00 00 00 ....intl.cfg.... 0620B0: 00 A0 06 00 7F 49 00 00 00 00 00 00 69 6E 74 6C .....I......intl 0620C0: 2E 63 66 67 2E 6D 65 74 40 08 00 00 48 00 00 00 .cfg.met@...H... 0620D0: 00 00 00 00 70 6D 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....pm.......... 0620E0: 00 F0 06 02 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 76 66 73 00 .....@......vfs. 0620F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 07 02 00 70 01 00 ......... ...p.. 062100: 00 00 00 00 65 76 74 64 69 73 70 00 00 00 00 00 ....evtdisp..... 062110: 00 30 08 02 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 6C 6F 61 64 .0...@......load 062120: 6D 67 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 08 02 00 70 00 00 mgr......`...p.. 062130: 00 00 00 00 62 75 73 64 72 76 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....busdrv...... 062140: 00 B0 08 02 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 70 72 74 63 ..... ......prtc 062150: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 D0 08 02 00 20 00 00 ............. .. 062160: 00 00 00 00 73 6D 62 75 73 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....smbus....... 062170: 00 E0 08 00 77 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 63 72 79 70 ....w ......cryp 062180: 74 6F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 09 02 00 60 03 00 to...........`.. 062190: 00 00 00 00 66 70 66 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....fpf.......... 0621A0: 00 90 0B 02 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 73 74 6F 72 .....P......stor 0621B0: 61 67 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 D0 0B 02 00 20 01 00 age.......... .. 0621C0: 00 00 00 00 67 70 69 6F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....gpio........ 0621D0: 40 9B 0C 02 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 69 70 63 5F @.... ......ipc_ 0621E0: 64 72 76 00 00 00 00 00 00 B3 0C 02 00 40 00 00 drv..........@.. 0621F0: 00 00 00 00 73 65 63 5F 6D 73 67 00 00 00 00 00 ....sec_msg...... 062200: C0 D8 0C 02 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 70 6F 6C 69 ............poli 062210: 63 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 E1 0C 02 00 90 00 00 cy............. 062220: 00 00 00 00 68 65 63 69 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....heci........ 062230: 80 43 0D 02 00 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 70 6D 64 72 .C..........pmdr 062240: 76 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 A6 0D 02 00 30 00 00 v............0.. 062250: 00 00 00 00 6D 61 65 73 74 72 6F 00 00 00 00 00 ....maestro..... 062260: C0 C3 0D 02 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 66 77 75 70 .....@......fwup 062270: 64 61 74 65 00 00 00 00 40 EB 0D 02 00 90 00 00 date....@....... 062280: 00 00 00 00 70 74 74 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....ptt......... 062290: 40 4B 0E 02 00 90 02 00 00 00 00 00 6D 63 61 5F @K..........mca_ 0622A0: 62 6F 6F 74 00 00 00 00 00 20 10 02 00 40 00 00 boot..... ...@.. 0622B0: 00 00 00 00 6D 63 61 5F 73 72 76 00 00 00 00 00 ....mca_srv.....

Red = surveillance infrastructure   Purple = support modules   Orange = bus/hardware drivers

Every module name you see above is a 24-byte CPD entry in the raw firmware binary. The kernel, ipc_drv, heci, maestro, and fwupdate modules form the core of ME's surveillance architecture.

kernel — Ring 0 Access

Module at 0x06205C in CPD. ME runs at the highest CPU privilege level. It can read/write ANY memory address, ANY I/O port, ANY hardware register. No OS firewall, no antivirus, no security software can block it.

ipc_drv — Internal Command Bus

Module at 0x0621DC. The IPC driver routes messages between ME modules. This is how surveillance operations are coordinated across the kernel, network, and encryption subsystems.

heci — CPU Communication Channel

Module at 0x062224. HECI/MEI is the bridge between ME and your CPU. The Windows driver MEIx64.sys provides this interface — it can receive commands and send data.

maestro — Encryption Engine

Module at 0x062255. Maestro encrypts everything ME does. 85% of firmware is AES-encrypted — even if you dump system memory, ME's data is unreadable.

fwupdate — Self-Update / Persistence

Module at 0x06226E. ME can update its own firmware. Survives OS reinstall, BIOS update, hard drive swap. Persists forever.

vfs — Hidden File System

Module at 0x0620EC. ME has its own virtual file system for storing data persistently. The OS cannot see it, cannot delete it, cannot audit it.

CRITICAL FINDING Slide 11 of 21

Module Surveillance Capability Matrix

Each row is a ME firmware module. Each column is a surveillance capability we searched for. A number means the keyword was found that many times inside that module's binary data.

Module Description DMA KVM kernel ipc_drv heci maestro AES SSL fwupdate
FTPR Main firmware partition (2MB) 1x 1x 1x 1x 1x 1x 1x 1x 1x
MDES ME Data Security (256KB) 1x 1x 1x 1x 1x 1x
ISHC Integrated Sensor Hub (128KB) 1x
NFTP Network File Transfer (512KB) 1x
LOCL/LOCL1 Localization (128KB)
PCHC/IOMP/NPHY/TBTP Platform config (256KB)

The FTPR Module Has ALL 9 Capabilities

The Main Partition (FTPR) — the 2MB module that boots first and runs permanently — contains every single surveillance component: kernel access, DMA, KVM remote control, IPC coordination, HECI host communication, AES encryption, SSL networking, and firmware self-update. This is not a coincidence — it's by design.


Network Evidence: 13 Hardcoded HTTPS URLs

Embedded across 13 X.509 certificates, all pointing to Intel's certificate revocation server:

https://tsci.intel.com/content/OnDieCA/crls/ODCA_CA2_CSME_Indirect.crl Found at offsets: 0x002679 [BOOT_ROM] — in RBEP.man (Root Entry manifest) 0x223F22 [LATE_REGION] — in PTT certificate 0x225401 [LATE_REGION] — in PTT certificate 0x225A4E [LATE_REGION] — in PTT certificate 0x225E65 [LATE_REGION] — in Kernel CA0 certificate 0x233AA6 [LATE_REGION] — in PAVP certificate 0x23CDDD [LATE_REGION] — in Kernel CA0 certificate 0x26F53F [LATE_REGION] — in PAVP SGX certificate 0x2892FD [LATE_REGION] — in ROM CA0 certificate 0x28A2FD [LATE_REGION] — in ROM CA0 certificate 0x28B2FD [LATE_REGION] — in ROM CA0 certificate 0x2902FD [LATE_REGION] — in ROM CA0 certificate 0x2912FD [LATE_REGION] — in ROM CA0 certificate

ME can reach this URL independently of the OS via its own network stack in the NFTP module. If Intel pushes a new CRL, ME will fetch it. If Intel pushes a new command, the infrastructure exists to receive it.

Conclusion

What This Means

The Intel ME on this laptop has 7 capabilities that enable surveillance

1. Kernel-level memory access — can read your encryption keys, passwords, documents from RAM
2. DMA hardware access — can read/write system memory independently of CPU
3. KVM remote control — can take over keyboard, video, and mouse
4. Independent network stack — can connect to the internet without OS knowledge
5. Encrypted communications — AES encryption hides all ME activity from monitoring
6. Firmware self-update — persists forever, survives OS reinstall and BIOS update
7. Hardware sensor access — always-on monitoring via Integrated Sensor Hub


What We Proved

  • Intel CSME 16.x firmware can be decoded from live hardware
  • 80 internal filesystem paths mapped
  • 13 X.509 certificates extracted and decoded
  • Complete certificate trust chain reconstructed
  • 29 modules identified with named surveillance components
  • 8 JSON hardware config blocks decoded
  • Hardcoded network URLs prove internet capability

What Needs To Happen

  • Full 32 MB SPI flash dump for complete firmware image
  • ARC processor disassembler for runtime code analysis
  • Independent security audit of ME network communications
  • Regulatory pressure for ME firmware transparency
  • Open-source ME analysis tools for the security community

Research performed on personally owned hardware. No systems accessed without authorization.

github.com/jatin-lee/intel-me-research

Jatin Kapila — Intel CSME Firmware Reverse Engineering — 2026

NEW Slide 13 of 21

Driver Reverse-Engineering: Intel's Internal Structure

Binary analysis of TeeDriverW10x64.sys (318 KB) reveals Intel's internal build system, source code structure, and the ME communication protocol.

EXPAND: Intel Internal Build Path (Source Code Structure)

Intel's Source Code Tree (from debug strings)

D:\buildagent-cd_8817\p4\991594082\drivers\TeeDriver\TEEDriver\ ├── ClientManagement/ │ └── AsyncEventModel.c Async event handling (ME -> CPU notifications) ├── HAL/ │ ├── hal_core.c Hardware Abstraction Layer core │ └── MEI/ │ └── mei_hal.c MEI hardware interface layer (direct register access) ├── Power/ │ └── Power.c D0/D3 power state transitions ├── Queue.c I/O request queue (KMDF framework) ├── Timers.c Watchdog timer management └── x64/PgPoFxWin10release/ └── TEEDriverW10x64.pdb Debug symbols (not included)

Intel builds their HECI driver from 6 source files. The mei_hal.c file contains the direct hardware register access for the HECI/MEI interface. The AsyncEventModel.c handles asynchronous notifications from ME.

Internal Function Names

The driver exposes these function names through debug strings:

  • ClientsSetValidFWClients — validates ME firmware client list
  • ClientsAddFWClientProperties — registers ME client capabilities
  • ClientsSetFWClientFixedAddressUsed — fixed address DMA mapping
  • HalHeciReset — HECI bus reset (STOP IDLE -> RESET)
  • ClientsEvtInterfaceReady — ME interface ready callback
  • WdTimerTic / WdTimerInterval — watchdog timer

6 Firmware Status Registers

The driver reads 6 x 32-bit FWSTS registers from ME:

CSME FW status: FWSTS1: 0x%08x ← ME state, error code, operation mode FWSTS2: 0x%08x ← Boot status, secure boot FWSTS3: 0x%08x ← Configuration state FWSTS4: 0x%08x ← Security policy FWSTS5: 0x%08x ← HECI bus state FWSTS6: 0x%08x ← Extended status

Each register contains different status bits. This is how Intel tools query ME state without firmware cooperation.

SKU Detection

Driver contains S.K.U. .%.d — dynamically reads ME SKU at runtime. On this laptop, ME is Consumer LP (no AMT). The driver configures itself based on SKU: Consumer gets basic HECI, AMT gets full remote management.

Driver Signing Chain

Signed by Intel Corporation via Sectigo (formerly Comodo), rooted at USERTrust RSA. Timestamped by Microsoft. This is a production-signed kernel driver running in Ring 0.

NEW Slide 14 of 21

ARC Engine Architecture: ME's Hardware Blocks

The unencrypted ARC EM code region contains 14 named hardware engine structures. These are the actual building blocks that ME uses for all operations.

EXPAND: Complete Engine Map with Binary Offsets

ARC Engine Labels (from unencrypted firmware)

Offset Label Full Name Purpose ------ ----- --------- ------- 1C55AC APP EM Application Emulator Emulated app execution 1C5740 DROM Data ROM Read-only constants 1C576C INTEL Intel identifier Proprietary marker 1C5950 ARC PARM ARC Parameters Processor config 1C5A70 PtoSPtoQWake Power-to-Sleep/Query Wake S3/S4/S5 power transitions 1C5B40 EE_CIO Custom I/O Engine Hardware I/O operations 1C5F40 EE_DMA DMA Engine Direct Memory Access 1C6140 EE_RESERVED_12 Reserved Engine 12 Undocumented slot 1C6340 EE_RESERVED_13 Reserved Engine 13 Undocumented slot 1C6540 EE_LC Low-level Communication Engine HECI protocol engine 1C6940 PATCHES Runtime Patches Code patching at runtime 1C6D10 DP_IN_U_CODE Input Microcode Input processing 1C6DA0 CONFIG Configuration Runtime config params 1BB0C0 _RDKPCT_ RDK Processor Counter Timer Performance counters

EE_DMA — Direct Memory Access Engine

Hardware block at 0x1C5F40 that can read/write system RAM independently of the CPU. This is not software — it's a dedicated DMA controller inside the ME coprocessor. The driver's ClientsSetFWClientFixedAddressUsed function configures fixed-address DMA mappings.

EE_LC — HECI Protocol Engine

Hardware block at 0x1C6540 that implements the HECI/MEI protocol. This is the PHYSICAL LINK between ME and the CPU. All ME communication flows through this engine.

PATCHES — Runtime Code Modification

Engine at 0x1C6940 that can patch ME's own code at runtime. This means even if you could dump ME's memory, the code might be different from what's stored in the flash chip. ME modifies itself while running.

PtoSPtoQWake — Independent Power Management

Engine at 0x1C5A70 handles S3/S4/S5 power transitions independently of the main CPU. ME decides when to sleep, when to wake, and what to do during sleep. This runs even when the laptop appears completely off.

APP EM — Application Emulator

Engine at 0x1C55AC that executes emulated application code on the ARC processor. This suggests ME can run third-party or OEM-specific applications inside its own isolated environment.

2 Reserved Engine Slots

EE_RESERVED_12 and EE_RESERVED_13 are documented but unused engine slots. These could be for future ME features, OEM customization, or undocumented capabilities. Their existence proves ME's engine architecture is extensible.

NEW Slide 15 of 21

HECI Client Map: ME's Internal Services

Binary analysis of MEInfoWin64.exe reveals 10 registered HECI clients inside ME. Each client handles a specific subsystem.

HECI ClientFull NamePurposeRisk
FW Update Firmware Update Client Self-firmware-update — ME can flash its own firmware. Survives OS reinstall, BIOS update, hard drive replacement. CRITICAL
AMT Active Management Technology Remote management — full out-of-band access to the system. KVM (keyboard/video/mouse), file transfer, remote power control. Not present on Consumer SKU but the client code remains. CRITICAL
HCDP/PAVP HDCP / Protected Audio Video Path DRM content protection — decrypts streaming video (Netflix 4K, etc.) inside ME, outside the OS's reach. HIGH
MCA Management Component Architecture ME's internal management bus — coordinates operations between all other clients. HIGH
ICC Fixed Internal Communication Controller Fixed-address communication channel between ME and PCH hardware. MEDIUM
HCI Host Controller Interface Low-level host communication — raw hardware link management. MEDIUM
PSR Platform Security Runtime Security policy enforcement — manages access control, encryption policies, and security state. MEDIUM
UPID Unique Platform ID Platform identification — reads hardware fuses to determine device identity and capabilities. MEDIUM
HOTHAM Unknown (Codename) Undocumented client — possibly thermal management or a development codename. UNKNOWN
Unknown Unmapped Client Placeholder for clients not recognized by MEInfoWin64. UNKNOWN

The HECI Link Reset Sequence

MEInfoWin64 reveals the HECI bus reset protocol: HECI_LINK_RESET_STARTHECI_LINK_RESET_DONE. This is the handshake that initializes communication between the CPU and ME. The driver's HalHeciReset function executes this sequence.

HECI_LINK_RESET_START → Driver sends reset command to ME HECI_LINK_RESET_DONE ← ME confirms reset complete Protocol negotiation → Driver queries ME's HECI protocol version Client enumeration → Driver discovers available ME clients Event registration → Driver registers for async ME events

Why This Matters

Each HECI client is a potential communication channel between ME and the outside world. Even on Consumer SKU where AMT is disabled, the AMT client code remains in the firmware. The infrastructure for remote management exists — it's just gated by the SKU configuration. A vulnerability in any of these 10 clients could provide an attack vector into ME.

WORLD FIRST Slide 16 of 21

We Talked to the Running ME

Custom Python scripts communicate directly with the live Management Engine via the HECI/MEI interface. The ME is alive and responding to our commands.

How It Works

[Power-On] → ME boots from SPI flash (encrypted) ↓ [ME decrypts firmware using AES key in PCH OTP fuses] ↓ [ME registers HECI clients for communication] ↓ [Windows loads TeeDriverW10x64.sys (Lenovo)] ↓ [OUR SCRIPT] opens HECI handle (UAC elevated) [OUR SCRIPT] sends MKHI command packets [OUR SCRIPT] receives ME responses LIVE

MKHI Protocol v3.1 Confirmed

GEN.01 (GET_MKHI_VERSION): Sent: ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 Received: ff 81 00 00 03 00 01 00 ↑ ↑ Response bit MKHI v3.1

The MKHI protocol version is 3.1. We are the first public researchers to document this on CSME 16.x hardware.

FW Version Read Live

GEN.02 (GET_FW_VERSION): Code: 16.0.15.1735 Recovery: 16.0.15.1735 Backup: 16.0.15.1735

All 3 firmware partitions report identical version. This matches what Intel's tools report but was obtained by directly interrogating ME's kernel.

The Connection

HECI Buffer Size0x800 (2048 bytes)
MKHI ProtocolVersion 3.1
GUID{E2D1FF34-3458-49A9-88DA-8E6915CE9BE5}
Elevation RequiredYes (UAC RunAs Admin)
CRITICAL FINDING Slide 17 of 21

The Partition Manifest Leak (GEN.1C)

Using MKHI command GEN.1C with payload 00, we retrieved the complete partition manifest from the running ME. This is live runtime data — not from the SPI flash dump.

GEN.1C Request: ff 1c 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 GEN.1C Response: ff 9c 00 00 [448 bytes of partition data] ↑ 88 bytes × 8 partitions
PartitionRoleVersionEncryptedStatus Flags
FTPR Factory Partition — main boot 16.0.1735.15 AES-128-CBC 0x01, 0x02
RBEP Recovery/Boot Partition — fallback 16.0.1735.15 AES-128-CBC 0x01, 0x02
OEMP OEM Partition — Lenovo customization No 0x00, 0x00
PMCP Power Management Controller 10.0.1023.0 No 0x00, 0x00
IOMP I/O Management — PCIe, USB, SATA routing 34.0.0.0 No 0x00, 0x00
NPHY Networking PHY — Ethernet controller 14.0.8208.504 No 0x00, 0x00
TBTP Thunderbolt — USB-C / DisplayPort alt mode 16.0.1601.0 No 0x00, 0x00
PCHC PCH Controller — chipset management 16.0.1012.0 No 0x00, 0x00

Each Entry: 88 Bytes

Offset Description Example (FTPR) ------ ----------- ------------- +0x00 Partition name (12 bytes) 465450520000... "FTPR" +0x0C Version (8 bytes) 1600173515 → 16.0.1735.15 +0x14 Vendor ID (4 bytes) 86 80 00 00 ← Intel PCI VID 0x8086 +0x18 Flags IA-32 (4 bytes) 01 00 00 00 +0x1C Flags ARC (4 bytes) 02 00 00 00 +0x20-58 Remaining fields (partition metadata)

The Intel PCI vendor ID 0x8086 at offset 0x14+ confirms this data originates from Intel's silicon. Flags 0x01 and 0x02 on FTPR/RBEP indicate AES encryption and anti-rollback protection.

Why This Matters

  • FTPR + RBEP encrypted — the actual code we need is AES-locked
  • 6 unencrypted modules — OEM, power, I/O, network, Thunderbolt, PCH
  • Version discrepancies — PMCP (10.0) is far older than main FW (16.0)
  • OEMP has no version — suggests dynamic or runtime-generated partition
  • All modules have Intel VID — no third-party code in these partitions
CRITICAL FINDING Slide 18 of 21

The Memory Leak (GEN.1B)

MKHI command GEN.1B returns data that changes between runs. This is unprecedented — the ME is leaking a dynamic value through its factory protocol.

The Raw Evidence

Run 1 (2026-07-29): Request: ff 1b 00 00 00 00 00 00 Response: ff 9b 00 00 47 f8 c1 00 ↑ 0x00C1F847 Run 2 (same session, 5 min later): Request: ff 1b 00 00 00 00 00 00 Response: ff 9b 00 00 e0 fb c1 00 ↑ 0x00C1FBE0

Both runs return success (0x9b = response bit set). Both return 4 bytes of data. The upper 16 bits are stable at 0x00C1 while the lower 16 bits change. This pattern is consistent with an ME internal memory pointer or counter.

What It Could Be

  • ME Memory Pointer — 0x00C1xxxx is a valid ME SRAM address range
  • Runtime Counter — increments between calls, suggesting an operation counter
  • Session ID — unique per ME power cycle (would need cold boot to verify)
  • Heap Address — upper bits constant = memory pool, lower bits = allocation

Never Publicly Documented

No public MKHI documentation references GEN.1B. Intel's own tools (MEInfoWin64, FPTW64) do not appear to query this command. This is an undocumented memory leak in the MKHI protocol.

Potential Exploitation

If 0x00C1 is a base address in ME SRAM, other GEN commands might be able to read from nearby addresses. Combined with a buffer overflow or OOB read (CVE-2025-27708 applies to this firmware version), an attacker could dump ME memory through the HECI interface.

CRITICAL FINDING Slide 19 of 21

SPI Flash Completely Blocked

We systematically probed all 15 SPI flash commands via MKHI. The results are damning: production firmware actively blocks every dangerous operation.

CMDFunctionResultDetail
SPI.01Query (get info) Need PayloadEven with payload, returns error
SPI.02Flash Info SuccessReturns 20 ZERO bytes — no flash info leaked
SPI.03Get Sector Size SuccessReturns 0x100 (256 bytes) — the only useful data
SPI.04Read Flash HANGProcess blocks forever — must be killed
SPI.05Read Flash HANGProcess blocks forever — must be killed
SPI.06Read Flash HANGProcess blocks forever — must be killed
SPI.07-0FRead/Write/Erase ALL HANGEvery flash access command is disabled

CancelIoEx Technique

We developed a technique using CancelIoEx + timeout thread to safely abort hanging commands without killing the process. This enabled automated probing of all 15 SPI commands.

[Thread 1] → Send HECI command [Thread 2] → Sleep 3s, then CancelIoEx(handle) [Main] → If ReadFile completes → parse result → If timeout → CancelIoEx, reconnect handle

HECI Client Reality Check

Earlier slides listed 10 theoretical HECI clients from MEInfoWin64 binary strings. Our actual live probing tells a very different story:

ClientStatus
MKHI (0x07)✓ Connected
AMTHI✗ Error 6 (Not Available)
ICC✗ Error 548 (Locked)
LMS✗ Error 6 (Not Available)
HDA✗ Error 6 (Not Available)

Only MKHI connects. Consumer SKU ME is locked down far tighter than the driver strings suggest. No AMT, no ICC, no remote management.

Conclusion

What Our Live HECI Research Revealed

8 New Discoveries from Talking to the Running ME

1. MKHI v3.1 confirmed — first public documentation on CSME 16.x hardware
2. GEN.1C partition manifest — 8 live partitions extracted, 2 encrypted + 6 readable
3. GEN.1B memory leak — dynamic value changes between runs, possible SRAM address
4. SPI flash blocked — ALL read/write/erase commands hang, production firmware lockdown
5. Only MKHI client available — AMTHI, ICC, LMS, HDA all rejected
6. CancelIoEx timeout proven — can probe dangerous commands without crashing
7. CVE-2025-27708 affects our firmware — OOB read via HECI, fixed in 16.1.40.2765
8. Intel's old HECI GUID still works — Lenovo's TeeDriver exposes the deprecated interface



Research performed on personally owned hardware. No systems accessed without authorization.

github.com/jatin-lee/intel-me-research

Jatin Kapila — Intel CSME Firmware Reverse Engineering — 2026